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|a GBB310609
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|a 016269437
|2 Uk
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|a 9780199681914
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|a 0199681910
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|a (OCoLC)827266747
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|a (OCoLC)ocn827266747
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|a DLC
|c DLC
|d UKMGB
|d OCLCO
|d BTCTA
|d YDXCP
|d EYM
|d BDX
|d LHU
|d PUL
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCF
|d OCLCO
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|a U@SA
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|a K5018
|b .T33 2013
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|a 345.001
|2 23
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Tadros, Victor.
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| 245 |
1 |
4 |
|a The ends of harm :
|b the moral foundations of criminal law /
|c Victor Tadros.
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| 250 |
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|a 1st paperback ed.
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| 260 |
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|a Oxford, UK :
|b Oxford University Press,
|c 2013, c2011.
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| 300 |
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|a xiv, 370 p. ;
|c 24 cm.
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| 490 |
1 |
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|a Oxford legal philosophy
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| 504 |
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|a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 361-368) e índice.
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| 505 |
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|a 1. Introduction -- The Aims of Punishment -- 2. Justifying Punishment -- 3. Recognition and Choice -- 4. Against Desert -- 5. The Limits of Communication Means, Motivations, and Ends -- 6. Defending the Means Principle -- 7. Wrongdoing and Motivation -- Permissibility, Harm, and Self-Defence -- 8. Choice, Responsibility, and Permissible Harm -- 9. Conflicts and Permissibility -- 10. Mistakes and Self-Defence -- 11. Responsibility and Self-Defence Punishment and the Duties of Offenders -- 12. Punishment as a Remedy -- 13. State Punishment -- 14. Protection Against Punishment -- 15. Proportionate Punishment.
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| 520 |
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|a "Victor Tadros sets out to defend the ‘duty view’ of punishment. On this view, the permission to punish offenders is grounded in the duties that they incur in virtue of their wrongdoing. The most important duties that ground the justification of punishment are the duty to recognise that the offender has done wrong and the duty to protect others against wrongdoing. In the light of these duties the state has a permission to punish offenders to ensure that they recognise that what they have done is wrong, but also to protect others from crime. Hence, the book offers a defence not only of a communicative view of punishment but also of general deterrence as central to the justification of punishment. This view is developed in the light of a non-consequentialist moral theory: a theory which endorses constraints on the pursuit of the good. It is shown that it is normally wrong to harm a person as a means to pursue a greater good. However, there are exceptions to this principle in cases where the person harmed has an enforceable duty to pursue the good. The implications of this idea are explored both in the context of self-defence, and then in the context of punishment. The book offers the most systematic exploration of the relationship between self-defence and punishment to date and makes significant progress in defending a plausible set of non-consequentialist moral principles. It also critically explores other theories of punishment, including retributivism and purely communicative theories, identifying unexamined deficiencies in these theories." --Descripción del editor.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Criminal law
|x Moral and ethical aspects.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Punishment
|x Moral and ethical aspects.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Criminal law
|x Philosophy.
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Derecho penal
|x Aspectos morales y éticos.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Pena (Derecho penal)
|x Aspectos morales y éticos.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Derecho penal
|x Filosofía.
|2 UDESA
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| 830 |
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0 |
|a Oxford legal philosophy
|