Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law

Arendt's examination of the Eichmann case provides another point of view to elucidate a fundamental aspect already present in The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the ambition of totalitarianism is less to control human spontaneity than to eradicate it completely and make it sup...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Leibovici, Martine
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. 2022
Materias:
ley
law
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/pescadoradeperlas/article/view/36715
Aporte de:
id I10-R296-article-36715
record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-296
container_title_str Pescadora de Perlas. Revista de estudios arendtianos
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic ley
obediencia
discurso
totalitarismo
law
speech
totalitarianism
obedience
obediência
ley
discurso
totalitarismo
spellingShingle ley
obediencia
discurso
totalitarismo
law
speech
totalitarianism
obedience
obediência
ley
discurso
totalitarismo
Leibovici, Martine
Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
topic_facet ley
obediencia
discurso
totalitarismo
law
speech
totalitarianism
obedience
obediência
ley
discurso
totalitarismo
author Leibovici, Martine
author_facet Leibovici, Martine
author_sort Leibovici, Martine
title Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
title_short Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
title_full Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
title_fullStr Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
title_full_unstemmed Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law
title_sort totalitarianism and perversion of the law
description Arendt's examination of the Eichmann case provides another point of view to elucidate a fundamental aspect already present in The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the ambition of totalitarianism is less to control human spontaneity than to eradicate it completely and make it superfluous. This can only be achieved by setting up devices for twisting, deviating and inverting human relationships and ways of life. While it requires the complicity of all to implement such a project, it also requires actors involved to the point of direct criminality, such as Eichmann. Eichmann's justifications in the Jerusalem trial hint directly at the "dis-interestedness" of the totalitarian actor Arendt speaks of in Origins: someone who has withdrawn from himself and deposited his own self and his capacity to act in the self of the Führer, identified with the people. As if nothing was left of his spontaneity but his vital energy. Eichmann also hid behind the famous "obedience to orders", but Arendt pays special attention to the precision that Eichmann adds, according to which he obeyed the Führer's will, which had acquired the force of law. Claude Lefort calls this identification a "perversion of the law". In what follows, I intend to base our analysis of totalitarian perversion and the perversion of the law on a recent work by the jurist Olivier Jouanjan, devoted to legal ideology as it appears in the Nazi discourse and practice of law.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades.
publishDate 2022
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/pescadoradeperlas/article/view/36715
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T22:44:28Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T22:44:28Z
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spelling I10-R296-article-367152023-01-07T20:13:30Z Totalitarianism and Perversion of the Law Totalitarismo y perversión de la ley Totalitarismo e perversão da lei Leibovici, Martine ley obediencia discurso totalitarismo law speech totalitarianism obedience obediência ley discurso totalitarismo Arendt's examination of the Eichmann case provides another point of view to elucidate a fundamental aspect already present in The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to Arendt, the ambition of totalitarianism is less to control human spontaneity than to eradicate it completely and make it superfluous. This can only be achieved by setting up devices for twisting, deviating and inverting human relationships and ways of life. While it requires the complicity of all to implement such a project, it also requires actors involved to the point of direct criminality, such as Eichmann. Eichmann's justifications in the Jerusalem trial hint directly at the "dis-interestedness" of the totalitarian actor Arendt speaks of in Origins: someone who has withdrawn from himself and deposited his own self and his capacity to act in the self of the Führer, identified with the people. As if nothing was left of his spontaneity but his vital energy. Eichmann also hid behind the famous "obedience to orders", but Arendt pays special attention to the precision that Eichmann adds, according to which he obeyed the Führer's will, which had acquired the force of law. Claude Lefort calls this identification a "perversion of the law". In what follows, I intend to base our analysis of totalitarian perversion and the perversion of the law on a recent work by the jurist Olivier Jouanjan, devoted to legal ideology as it appears in the Nazi discourse and practice of law. El examen arendtiano del caso Eichmann dilucida desde otro punto de vista, una dimensión fundamental ya presente en Los orígenes del totalitarismo. Según Arendt, la ambición del totalitarismo es menos la de llegar a controlar la espontaneidad humana que la de erradicarla completamente y hacerla superflua. Eso no se logra sino a través del emplazamiento de dispositivos de torsión, de desviación, de inversión de los modos de ser y de los lazos humanos. Si bien se requiere la complicidad de todos para poner en obra tal proyecto, también se necesita actores implicados al punto de la criminalidad directa, como Eichmann. Las justificaciones de Eichmann en el proceso en Jerusalén dejan entrever directamente lo que ha sido el “des-interés” del actor totalitario del que habla Arendt en Los orígenes: alguien que se ha retirado de sí mismo y que depositó su propio yo y su capacidad de actuar en el yo del Führer, identificado al pueblo. Como si no quedara de su espontaneidad más que la sola energía vital. Eichmann también se escudó detrás de la famosa “obediencia a las órdenes”, pero Arendt presta especial atención a la precisión que agrega Eichmann según la cual obedecía la voluntad del Führer que había adquirido fuerza de Ley. Claude Lefort la llama a esta identificación “perversión de la ley”. En lo que sigue, me propongo apoyar nuestros análisis de la pervertización totalitaria y la perversión de la ley en una obra reciente del jurista Olivier Jouanjan, consagrada a la ideología jurídica tal como aparece en el discurso y la práctica nazis del derecho. O exame de Arendt do caso Eichmann elucida, de outro ponto de vista, uma dimensão fundamental já presente em Origens do Totalitarismo. De acordo com Arendt, a ambição do totalitarismo é menos controlar a espontaneidade humana do que erradicá-la completamente e torná-la supérflua. Isto só pode ser alcançado através de dispositivos que torcem, desviam e invertem formas de ser e laços humanos. Embora exija a cumplicidade de todos para implementar tal projeto, também requer atores envolvidos até o ponto da criminalidade direta, tais como Eichmann. As justificações de Eichmann no julgamento de Jerusalém sugerem diretamente a "desinteresse" do ator totalitário de que Arendt fala em Origens: alguém que se retirou de si mesmo e depositou seu próprio eu e sua capacidade de agir no eu do Führer, identificado com o povo. Como se nada sobrasse de sua espontaneidade, a não ser sua energia vital. Eichmann também se escondeu atrás da famosa "obediência às ordens", mas Arendt presta especial atenção à indicação de Eichmann, segundo a qual ele obedeceu à vontade do Führer, que havia adquirido a força da lei. Claude Lefort chama esta identificação de uma "perversão da lei". No que segue, pretendo basear a nossa análise da perversão totalitária e da perversão da lei em um trabalho recente do jurista Olivier Jouanjan, dedicado à ideologia jurídica como aparece no discurso e na prática do direito nazista. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. 2022-09-20 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Dossier application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/pescadoradeperlas/article/view/36715 Pescadora de Perlas. Revista de estudios arendtianos; Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2022): Dossier: Totalitarismo, autoritarismo y formas contemporáneas de dominación; 96-117 2953-4410 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/pescadoradeperlas/article/view/36715/38812 Derechos de autor 2022 Martine Leibovici https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0