Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
In the last decades, the empiricist theories of concepts have managed to have a certain weight in psychology and in philosophy. In this paper I intend to evaluate the empirical support that Prinz's theory of concepts (2002, 2005) possesses, according to which all concepts and cognitive processe...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
2018
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/19159 |
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| Sumario: | In the last decades, the empiricist theories of concepts have managed to have a certain weight in psychology and in philosophy. In this paper I intend to evaluate the empirical support that Prinz's theory of concepts (2002, 2005) possesses, according to which all concepts and cognitive processes are conveyed by modal representations. In particular, I intend to evaluate if, and to what extent, the empirical evidence cited by the empiricism of concepts is favorable to this theory and, secondly, I intend to consider the case of numerical representations, while it seems to be a case that It challenges the sufficiency of concept empiricism to account for all the phenomena that a theory of concepts should explain. |
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