Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles

In the last decades, the empiricist theories of concepts have managed to have a certain weight in psychology and in philosophy. In this paper I intend to evaluate the empirical support that Prinz's theory of concepts (2002, 2005) possesses, according to which all concepts and cognitive processe...

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Autor principal: Olmos, Andrea
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2018
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/19159
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spelling I10-R363-article-191592019-06-07T11:05:37Z Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles Empirismo de conceptos: Un tratamiento de la evidencia para los vehículos representacionales amodales Olmos, Andrea concept empiricism amodal representations modal representations representational vehicles empirismo de conceptos representaciones amodales representaciones modales vehículos representacionales In the last decades, the empiricist theories of concepts have managed to have a certain weight in psychology and in philosophy. In this paper I intend to evaluate the empirical support that Prinz's theory of concepts (2002, 2005) possesses, according to which all concepts and cognitive processes are conveyed by modal representations. In particular, I intend to evaluate if, and to what extent, the empirical evidence cited by the empiricism of concepts is favorable to this theory and, secondly, I intend to consider the case of numerical representations, while it seems to be a case that It challenges the sufficiency of concept empiricism to account for all the phenomena that a theory of concepts should explain. En las últimas décadas, las teorías empiristas de conceptos han logrado tener cierto peso en psicología y en filosofía. En este trabajo me propongo evaluar el apoyo empírico que posee la teoría de conceptos de Prinz (2002, 2005), según la cual todos los conceptos y procesos cognitivos se encuentran vehiculados por representaciones modales. En particular, me propongo evaluar si, y en qué medida, la evidencia empírica citada por el empirismo de conceptos es favorable a dicha teoría y, en segundo lugar, me propongo considerar el caso de las representaciones numéricas, en tanto parece ser un caso que desafía la suficiencia del empirismo de conceptos para dar cuenta de todos los fenómenos que una teoría de conceptos debería explicar. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2018-04-24 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/19159 10.32348/1852.4206.v10.n1.19159 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol. 10 No. 1 (2018): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; 55-65 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol. 10 Núm. 1 (2018): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; 55-65 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v10.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/19159/Olmo2018 Derechos de autor 2018 Andrea Olmos
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-363
container_title_str Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic concept empiricism
amodal representations
modal representations
representational vehicles
empirismo de conceptos
representaciones amodales
representaciones modales
vehículos representacionales
spellingShingle concept empiricism
amodal representations
modal representations
representational vehicles
empirismo de conceptos
representaciones amodales
representaciones modales
vehículos representacionales
Olmos, Andrea
Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
topic_facet concept empiricism
amodal representations
modal representations
representational vehicles
empirismo de conceptos
representaciones amodales
representaciones modales
vehículos representacionales
author Olmos, Andrea
author_facet Olmos, Andrea
author_sort Olmos, Andrea
title Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
title_short Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
title_full Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
title_fullStr Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
title_full_unstemmed Concept empiricism: A treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
title_sort concept empiricism: a treatment of the evidence for the amodal representational vehicles
description In the last decades, the empiricist theories of concepts have managed to have a certain weight in psychology and in philosophy. In this paper I intend to evaluate the empirical support that Prinz's theory of concepts (2002, 2005) possesses, according to which all concepts and cognitive processes are conveyed by modal representations. In particular, I intend to evaluate if, and to what extent, the empirical evidence cited by the empiricism of concepts is favorable to this theory and, secondly, I intend to consider the case of numerical representations, while it seems to be a case that It challenges the sufficiency of concept empiricism to account for all the phenomena that a theory of concepts should explain.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2018
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/19159
work_keys_str_mv AT olmosandrea conceptempiricismatreatmentoftheevidencefortheamodalrepresentationalvehicles
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T22:31:03Z
last_indexed 2024-09-03T22:31:03Z
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