The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
Students of institutions have identified a pattern of ―serial replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin American countries in which institutional change has become frequent as well as radical. Patterns of serial replacement underlie wellknown ―traps‖ of deinstitutionalization: military coups beget...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
SeIDeSoC
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356 http://hdl.handle.net/2133/10356 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | Students of institutions have
identified a pattern of ―serial
replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin
American countries in which
institutional change has become
frequent as well as radical. Patterns
of serial replacement underlie wellknown
―traps‖ of deinstitutionalization:
military coups
beget more coups, democratic
breakdowns make breakdowns more
likely, constitutional replacements
encourage the adoption of new
constitutions, inter-branch conflicts
feed further conflicts, and so on. In
this paper we develop a theory of
serial replacement and apply it to
explain cycles of judicial instability
in 18 Latin American countries.
Using a novel dataset covering more
than 3,000 Supreme Court and
Constitutional Tribunal justices
between 1900 and 2010, we show
that political attempts to reshuffle
Supreme Courts and Constitutional
Tribunals encourage new attempts
to reshuffle the high courts in later years, creating a sequential pattern
of judicial instability. |
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