Decision for intuition and decision for representation: Georges Sorel and Carl Schmitt facing the crisis of Rule of Law
In this article I review Schmitt's references to Sorel, trying to demonstrate that where Schmitt pretends to agree with Sorel (mostly in the criticism of the Rule of Law), significant philosophical differences nevertheless persist. To this end, I disaggregate decisionism into three analytical d...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Grupo Prohistoria
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | https://ojs.rosario-conicet.gov.ar/index.php/prohistoria/article/view/1848 |
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| Sumario: | In this article I review Schmitt's references to Sorel, trying to demonstrate that where Schmitt pretends to agree with Sorel (mostly in the criticism of the Rule of Law), significant philosophical differences nevertheless persist. To this end, I disaggregate decisionism into three analytical dimensions (juridical, gnoseological and theologico-political), finding opposite positions in each of them: (a) while for Schmitt “State proves that to produce law it need not be based on law”, for Sorel law rise spontaneously and outside the State; (b) while for Schmitt decisionism means "decision for representation", for Sorel it expresses "decision for intuition"; and (c) while for Schmitt this decision is analogous to a miracle, for Sorel it only goes along with the providential cycles of the rise and decline of culture. |
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