Outsider Presidents and Neophyte Ministers: Evidence from the Fujimori Example
The critics of presidentialism point out that the arrival to power of outsiders is one of the perils of presidentialism. This contributes to this literature by analyzing the impact of outsider presidents on cabinet composition. The central argument is that outsider presidents tend to appoint technoc...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Salamanca
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/10244 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=es/es-011&d=article10244oai |
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| Sumario: | The critics of presidentialism point out that the arrival to power of outsiders is one of the perils of presidentialism. This contributes to this literature by analyzing the impact of outsider presidents on cabinet composition. The central argument is that outsider presidents tend to appoint technocratic and independent ministers. Outsiders do not have the willingness or the capacity to negotiate with other political forces because they lack a political socialization. Moreover, a strategy of confrontation with established parties is politically and electorally more advantageous for outsider presidents. In this article, I provide empirical evidence based on an in-depth analysis of the Peruvian cabinets in the period 1980-1995. This work compares the cabinets of two presidents that were traditional party leaders (Belaúnde and García) with the cabinets of an outsider (Fujimori). I also analyze the consequences of having a cabinet made of political neophytes for the functioning of the cabinet. |
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