Favoritism, anonimity and renegotiation in procurement

This paper shed2 light on a mechanism for implementing favoritism even in a symmetric framework. We analyze a procurement setting in which the optimal design of the project is unknown. The sponsor has to invest in specifying the project. The larger the investment, the higher the probability that the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Weinschelbaum, Federico, Arozamena, Leandro, Ganuza, Juan Jose
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2018
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Auctions
Favoritism
Auction Design
Renegotiation
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169186
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata

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