The Kantian Motivations Behind McDowell's Conceptualism
This paper presents an analysis of the Kantian roots of the debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists in contemporary philosophy of perception and cognitive sciences. To this end, I begin by reconstructing the general outlines of McDowell's (1994a) conceptualist position. I then poin...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/16506 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=16506_oai |
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| Sumario: | This paper presents an analysis of the Kantian roots of the debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists in contemporary philosophy of perception and cognitive sciences. To this end, I begin by reconstructing the general outlines of McDowell's (1994a) conceptualist position. I then point out the epistemic, transcendental, and ethical motivations that led the author to defend this position, highlighting its affinity with certain milestones of Kantian philosophy. Next, I analyze McDowell’s (2008a) revision of his position in light of non-conceptualist criticisms, the notion of "intuitional content," and its relationship with the aforementioned motivations. Finally, I argue that the authors of such criticisms still owe a dialogue with the foundational premise that sparked the debate: "intuitions, without concepts, are blind" (Kant KrV, A51/B76). |
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