Referencia directa, actitudes proposicionales e intrusiones pragmáticas
In this paper, a view of attitude ascriptions compatible with Direct Reference Theories (DRTs) of proper names is defended. Unlike customary accounts of the information conveyed by attitude reports in line with DRTs, this approach attempts to capture the truth-conditional relevance of ordinary intui...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/2441 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=2441_oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In this paper, a view of attitude ascriptions compatible with Direct Reference Theories (DRTs) of proper names is defended. Unlike customary accounts of the information conveyed by attitude reports in line with DRTs, this approach attempts to capture the truth-conditional relevance of ordinary intuitions and at the same time recognizes their pragmatic character. This is achieved by recourse to the concept of pragmatic intrusion, for which independent motivation is offered. |
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