Sobre la importancia de los conocimientos del autor respecto del juicio de riesgo dentro del marco de la teoría de la imputación objetiva

The aggregation of subjective knowledge in the judgment of risk when charging the author with the event is not a peaceful topic in doctrine. Since the introduction of the judgment of risk, with the adequacy theory, until the objective imputation theory currently present, the fact of whether to provi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Pedulla, Matías
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones 2018
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Acceso en línea:http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/100/sobre-la-importancia-de-los-conocimientos-del-autor.pdf
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pderecho/lecciones&cl=CL1&d=HWA_3015
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_3015.dir/3015.PDF
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Sumario:The aggregation of subjective knowledge in the judgment of risk when charging the author with the event is not a peaceful topic in doctrine. Since the introduction of the judgment of risk, with the adequacy theory, until the objective imputation theory currently present, the fact of whether to provide to a hypothetical judge with the basic knowledge of a reasonable man, also adding the special knowledge that the author might have is a much debated topic between two main positions. The majority one -subjectivist- supports its aggregation, while the minority position -objectivist- denies it and opts for a sociolegal theory. While both of them may lead to flawed reasoning, a third position, denying knowledge and roles alike, offers a judgment of risk closer to objectiveness, from the point of view of an omniscient observer.