¿Algo más sobre la justificación del castigo?
This paper - originally conceived as a lecture - expounds a group of philosophical concepts and arguments that build up a defense of the intrinsic (non-instrumental) value that may be found in punishment and its institutionalization through criminal law. The paper links Joel Finberg's analysis...
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| Formato: | Artículo acceptedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pderecho/lecciones&cl=CL1&d=HWA_7742 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_7742.dir/7742.PDF |
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| Sumario: | This paper - originally conceived as a lecture - expounds a group of philosophical concepts and arguments that build up a defense of the intrinsic (non-instrumental) value that may be found in punishment and its institutionalization through criminal law. The paper links Joel Finberg's analysis of the notion of punishment and Peter Strawson's conception of responsibility with a version of an argument by Igor Primoratz. It also places defenses of this kind of the value of punishment in relation to radical anti- punitive views, and responds a traditional liberal objection according to which retributive justice justifications of punishment would involve a commitment to punishment for character traits. -- "The original version of this text was presented as a conference at the International Conference on Criminal Law of the National University of Cuyo, Mendoza, on November 9, 2017." |
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