The notion of res in Duns Scotus and the reason for rejecting the real distinction of essence and existence
The distinction between essence and existence was held as one of the fundamental questions of metaphysics during scholasticism. Duns Scotus was emphatic in rejecting the thesis that the essence and the existence of a being are really distinct. In order to understand this rejection, in this article w...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Portugués |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/12602 |
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| Sumario: | The distinction between essence and existence was held as one of the fundamental questions of metaphysics during scholasticism. Duns Scotus was emphatic in rejecting the thesis that the essence and the existence of a being are really distinct. In order to understand this rejection, in this article we analyze the notion of thing (res) in Scotus’ doctrine, especially in his criticism of Henry of Ghent concerning the ontological status of the creatable, taking into account the reception of the Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions. Scotus and Henry adopt different perspectives of the notion of res and reach divergent conclusions question of essence and existence in the context of the creation of the world. We also analyze Scotus’ argument regarding the nature of the simplicity found in creation, and how the Subtle Doctor argues for the rejection of a necessary real composition in the structure of created being and, consequently, rejects again a real distinction between essence and existence. |
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