Cooperation, social networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoner's dilemma with adaptive local interactions

Cooperative behavior among a group of agents is studied assuming adaptive interactions. Each agent plays a Prisoner's Dilemma game with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff, and imitates the strategy of its best neighbor. Agents may punish or reward their neighbors by removing or s...

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Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado: 2005
Materias:
Numerical analysis
Perturbation techniques
Adaptive interactions
Local interactions
Network adaptation
Social networks
Behavioral research
Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_15393755_v72_n5_p_Zimmermann
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_15393755_v72_n5_p_Zimmermann
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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