Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance
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| LEADER | 00375 a2200109 4500 | ||
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| 001 | ART_11914 | ||
| 005 | 20260410161901.0 | ||
| 008 | 260409a | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance |
| 100 | 1 | |a Whinston, Michael D. | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Journal of public economics |g - Vol. 22, Nº 1 (oct. 1983) |w REV11485 | |
| 999 | |c 25943 |d 25943 | ||