Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis

This article examines the relationship between rationality, normativity, and reasoning, focusing on the alternative that John Broome offers to the traditional view that links these notions to normative reasons. According to the dominant perspective, being rational involves correctly responding to re...

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Autor principal: Mié Battán, Eugenio
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025
Materias:
Normatividad
Razonamiento
Racionalidad
John Broome
Normativity
Reasoning
Rationality
Acceso en línea:https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/279
Aporte de:
Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR) de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R231-article-279
record_format ojs
spelling I15-R231-article-2792025-12-22T22:55:14Z Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis Normatividad y razonamiento: Observaciones al análisis disposicional de Broome Mié Battán, Eugenio Normatividad Razonamiento Racionalidad John Broome Normativity Reasoning Rationality John Broome This article examines the relationship between rationality, normativity, and reasoning, focusing on the alternative that John Broome offers to the traditional view that links these notions to normative reasons. According to the dominant perspective, being rational involves correctly responding to reasons, understood as factors that justify beliefs or actions. Broome, by contrast, proposes a not necessarily normative conception of reasoning, understood as the intentional following of rules. The article reconstructs and analyzes the main elements of his view, including his distinction between genuine and non-genuine normativity, his characterization of rationality as coherence among attitudes, and his account of reasoning as a guided but not normatively demanding activity. Through a critical evaluation, it is argued that this conception faces three objections: its difficulty in distinguishing genuine reasoning from mere associative transitions, its limited capacity to account for the epistemic character of reasoning, and its apparent indifference to the rational demands that emerge from a subject’s own attitudes. Finally, it is suggested that Broome’s proposal can be interpreted as a form of normative skepticism, analogous to the kind Christine Korsgaard has identified in the domain of morality, offering a broader perspective on the philosophical commitments and limitations of his theory. Este artículo examina la relación entre racionalidad, normatividad y razonamiento, centrándose en la alternativa que John Broome ofrece frente al enfoque tradicional que vincula estas nociones con razones normativas. Según la perspectiva dominante, ser racional implica responder correctamente a razones, entendidas como factores que justifican creencias o acciones. Broome, en cambio, propone una concepción no-necesariamente normativa del razonamiento, concebido como seguimiento intencional de reglas. El trabajo reconstruye y analiza los principales elementos de su propuesta, incluyendo su distinción entre normatividad genuina y no genuina, su caracterización de la racionalidad como coherencia entre actitudes, y su explicación del razonamiento como una actividad guiada pero no normativamente exigente. A partir de una evaluación crítica, se argumenta que esta concepción enfrenta tres objeciones significativas: su dificultad para distinguir entre razonamientos genuinos y transiciones meramente asociativas, su limitada capacidad para dar cuenta del carácter epistémico del razonamiento, y su aparente indiferencia ante las exigencias racionales que emergen de las propias actitudes del sujeto. Finalmente, se sostiene que la propuesta de Broome puede interpretarse como una forma de escepticismo normativo, análoga a la que Christine Korsgaard ha identificado en el ámbito de la moralidad, lo que permite poner en perspectiva sus compromisos y limitaciones filosóficas. Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2025-12-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/279 10.35305/cf2.vi22.279 Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; No. 22 (2025) Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época; Núm. 22 (2025) 2683-9024 1850-3667 spa https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/279/209 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-231
container_title_str Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época (UNR)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Normatividad
Razonamiento
Racionalidad
John Broome
Normativity
Reasoning
Rationality
John Broome
spellingShingle Normatividad
Razonamiento
Racionalidad
John Broome
Normativity
Reasoning
Rationality
John Broome
Mié Battán, Eugenio
Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
topic_facet Normatividad
Razonamiento
Racionalidad
John Broome
Normativity
Reasoning
Rationality
John Broome
author Mié Battán, Eugenio
author_facet Mié Battán, Eugenio
author_sort Mié Battán, Eugenio
title Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
title_short Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
title_full Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
title_fullStr Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Normativity and Reasoning: Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
title_sort normativity and reasoning: observations on broome’s dispositional analysis
description This article examines the relationship between rationality, normativity, and reasoning, focusing on the alternative that John Broome offers to the traditional view that links these notions to normative reasons. According to the dominant perspective, being rational involves correctly responding to reasons, understood as factors that justify beliefs or actions. Broome, by contrast, proposes a not necessarily normative conception of reasoning, understood as the intentional following of rules. The article reconstructs and analyzes the main elements of his view, including his distinction between genuine and non-genuine normativity, his characterization of rationality as coherence among attitudes, and his account of reasoning as a guided but not normatively demanding activity. Through a critical evaluation, it is argued that this conception faces three objections: its difficulty in distinguishing genuine reasoning from mere associative transitions, its limited capacity to account for the epistemic character of reasoning, and its apparent indifference to the rational demands that emerge from a subject’s own attitudes. Finally, it is suggested that Broome’s proposal can be interpreted as a form of normative skepticism, analogous to the kind Christine Korsgaard has identified in the domain of morality, offering a broader perspective on the philosophical commitments and limitations of his theory.
publisher Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2025
url https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/279
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first_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:13Z
last_indexed 2026-01-04T05:04:13Z
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