Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining

In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cai, Hongbin, Cont, Walter
Formato: Articulo Preprint
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2004
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Incentives
Delegation
Bargaining
Commitment
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/127138
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-127138
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
Incentives
Delegation
Bargaining
Commitment
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
Incentives
Delegation
Bargaining
Commitment
Cai, Hongbin
Cont, Walter
Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
Incentives
Delegation
Bargaining
Commitment
description In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives.
format Articulo
Preprint
author Cai, Hongbin
Cont, Walter
author_facet Cai, Hongbin
Cont, Walter
author_sort Cai, Hongbin
title Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
title_short Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
title_full Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
title_fullStr Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
title_full_unstemmed Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
title_sort agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
publishDate 2004
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/127138
work_keys_str_mv AT caihongbin agencyproblemsandcommitmentindelegatedbargaining
AT contwalter agencyproblemsandcommitmentindelegatedbargaining
bdutipo_str Repositorios
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