Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information

This paper analyzes what happens to the Spence signaling model when there is heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character. Competency is productivity at work. Character is the taste for study. If heterogeneity in character is low, the equilibrium is separating. If heterogeneity in chara...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Streb, Jorge Miguel
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2002
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
JEL: J31, D10
asymmetric information, adverse selection, indices, signals, signs
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57453
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi130902.pdf
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-57453
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
JEL: J31, D10
asymmetric information, adverse selection, indices, signals, signs
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
JEL: J31, D10
asymmetric information, adverse selection, indices, signals, signs
Streb, Jorge Miguel
Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
JEL: J31, D10
asymmetric information, adverse selection, indices, signals, signs
description This paper analyzes what happens to the Spence signaling model when there is heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character. Competency is productivity at work. Character is the taste for study. If heterogeneity in character is low, the equilibrium is separating. If heterogeneity in character is high, the equilibrium is partially pooling. In the partially pooling equilibrium, only extreme types can be distinguished. Expected competency is monotonically increasing in the level of education. Supplementary information can reveal personal characteristics, acting as a sign of work productivity.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Streb, Jorge Miguel
author_facet Streb, Jorge Miguel
author_sort Streb, Jorge Miguel
title Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
title_short Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
title_full Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
title_fullStr Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
title_full_unstemmed Job Market Signaling under Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Information
title_sort job market signaling under two-dimensional asymmetric information
publishDate 2002
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57453
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi130902.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT strebjorgemiguel jobmarketsignalingundertwodimensionalasymmetricinformation
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820478259625984

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