Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception

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In this paper I will consider the reception of Phenomenology of Perception in contemporary Cognitive Sciences. My aim here consists in emphasizing the original understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy offered by Merleau-Ponty in his work. Merleau-Ponty, guided by the...

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Autor principal:	Battán Horenstein, Ariela
Formato:	Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:	Español
Publicado:	Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2021
Materias:	Merleau-Ponty phenomenology science trascendental logocentrism fenomenología ciencia logocentrismo
Acceso en línea:	https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/10977 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=10977_oai
Aporte de:	Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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spelling	I28-R145-10977_oai2025-11-17 Battán Horenstein, Ariela 2021-11-30 In this paper I will consider the reception of Phenomenology of Perception in contemporary Cognitive Sciences. My aim here consists in emphasizing the original understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy offered by Merleau-Ponty in his work. Merleau-Ponty, guided by the Husserlian call “back to the things themselves”, criticizes science conceived as a result of objective thought. In his opinion, science privileges explanation over description and hides under its theoretical constructions the primary validity of lived experience. However, in the merleau-pontyan comprehension of perception science is also involved as a source of material for phenomenological research. Under the light of this presupposition about the role played by science in phenomenological account of experience, my paper re-evaluate two critical lectures addressed against the comprehension of the merleau-pontyan legacy in the Cognitive Sciences research field. The first one is developed by G. B. Madison and his critiques aim at the Logocentrism implied in the Cognitive Sciences understanding of human cognition. The second is sustained by C. Pollard for whom Cognitive Sciences misread the project of Merleau-Ponty ignoring its transcendental goal. En este trabajo consideraré la recepción de Phénoménologie de la Perception en las Ciencias Cognitivas contemporáneas, con el objetivo de subrayar la original comprensión de la relación entre ciencia y filosofía propuesta por Merleau-Ponty en su obra. Merleau-Ponty, guiado por el lema husserliano de “volver a las cosas mismas”, critica a la ciencia concebida como resultado del pensamiento objetivo. En su opinión, la ciencia privilegia la explicación sobre la descripción y oculta así, debajo de sus constructos teóricos, la validez originaria de la experiencia vivida. Sin embargo, en la comprensión merleau-pontyana de la percepción está también implicada la ciencia como fuente de material para la investigación fenomenológica. A la luz de estas consideraciones sobre el papel desempeñado por la ciencia en la comprensión fenomenológica de la experiencia, me propongo reconsiderar dos lecturas críticas dirigidas contra la comprensión del legado merleau-pontyano en el campo de investigación de las Ciencias Cognitivas. La primera de ellas es desarrollada por G. B. Madison y sus críticas apuntan al logocentrismo implicado en las Ciencias Cognitivas. La segunda es sostenida por C. Pollard para quien las Ciencias Cognitivas malinterpretan el proyecto merleau-pontyano al ignorar el objetivo trascendental que la motiva. application/pdf text/html https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/10977 10.34096/cf.n75.10977 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/10977/9856 https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/10977/9870 Cuadernos de filosofía; Núm. 75 (2020): Julio-Diciembre 2362-485X 0590-1901 Merleau-Ponty phenomenology science trascendental logocentrism Merleau-Ponty fenomenología ciencia trascendental logocentrismo Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception Crítica y redención. El encuentro de las Ciencias Cognitivas con Fenomenología de la Percepción info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=10977_oai
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-145
collection	Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language	Español
orig_language_str_mv	spa
topic	Merleau-Ponty phenomenology science trascendental logocentrism Merleau-Ponty fenomenología ciencia trascendental logocentrismo
spellingShingle	Merleau-Ponty phenomenology science trascendental logocentrism Merleau-Ponty fenomenología ciencia trascendental logocentrismo Battán Horenstein, Ariela Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
topic_facet	Merleau-Ponty phenomenology science trascendental logocentrism Merleau-Ponty fenomenología ciencia trascendental logocentrismo
description	In this paper I will consider the reception of Phenomenology of Perception in contemporary Cognitive Sciences. My aim here consists in emphasizing the original understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy offered by Merleau-Ponty in his work. Merleau-Ponty, guided by the Husserlian call “back to the things themselves”, criticizes science conceived as a result of objective thought. In his opinion, science privileges explanation over description and hides under its theoretical constructions the primary validity of lived experience. However, in the merleau-pontyan comprehension of perception science is also involved as a source of material for phenomenological research. Under the light of this presupposition about the role played by science in phenomenological account of experience, my paper re-evaluate two critical lectures addressed against the comprehension of the merleau-pontyan legacy in the Cognitive Sciences research field. The first one is developed by G. B. Madison and his critiques aim at the Logocentrism implied in the Cognitive Sciences understanding of human cognition. The second is sustained by C. Pollard for whom Cognitive Sciences misread the project of Merleau-Ponty ignoring its transcendental goal.
format	Artículo publishedVersion
author	Battán Horenstein, Ariela
author_facet	Battán Horenstein, Ariela
author_sort	Battán Horenstein, Ariela
title	Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
title_short	Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
title_full	Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
title_fullStr	Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
title_full_unstemmed	Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception
title_sort	criticism and redemption, cognitive sciences meet phenomenology of perception
publisher	Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate	2021
url	https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/10977 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=10977_oai
work_keys_str_mv	AT battanhorensteinariela criticismandredemptioncognitivesciencesmeetphenomenologyofperception AT battanhorensteinariela criticayredencionelencuentrodelascienciascognitivasconfenomenologiadelapercepcion
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Criticism and redemption, Cognitive Sciences meet Phenomenology of Perception

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