The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications

Resumen: What is the role of presidents in the politics of redistribution in developing democracies? Do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence redistribution? Is redistribution shaped by political (that is, partisan) factors or do programmatic criteria play also a par...

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Autores principales: González, Lucas Isaac, Mamone, Miguel Ignacio, Bovino, Ana
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: American Political Science Association 2023
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Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17096
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spelling I33-R139-123456789-170962023-09-13T05:01:10Z The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications González, Lucas Isaac Mamone, Miguel Ignacio Bovino, Ana ECONOMIA POLITICA REDISTRIBUCION FEDERALISMO DEMOCRACIA PAISES EN DESARROLLO ESTADO INFRAESTRUCTURA FINANZAS PUBLICAS POLITICA COMPARADA Resumen: What is the role of presidents in the politics of redistribution in developing democracies? Do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence redistribution? Is redistribution shaped by political (that is, partisan) factors or do programmatic criteria play also a part? Redistribution in very unequal developing countries is a divisive issue. Most researchers recognize a crucial role of the state in redistributive politics. Despite this, there is little we know about the factors that shape government redistribution. This paper studies political and economic factors that affect the allocation of interregional redistributive transfers in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal countries in Latin America (the world’s most unequal region). The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central government may have large discretion: public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil (for the period 1999-2011), this paper shows that redistributive politics (in particular, the distribution of infrastructure funds) in developing federations is fundamentally determined by executive politics. The main claim is that presidents use redistributive transfers as a tool to build up sizeable and secure political support. We also found large variation in the relevance of Congress and programmatic criteria across cases, and that legislative overrepresentation is not always a relevant factor to explain redistribution, contrary to findings in the literature on the US and the European Union. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and the implications of these results for the broader comparative debate. 2023-09-12T18:05:59Z 2023-09-12T18:05:59Z 2012 Artículo González, L. I., Mamone, M. I., Bovino, A. The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications [en línea]. En: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting : 29 de agosto al 2 de september. Nueva Orleans : American Political Science Association, 2012. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17096 https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17096 eng Acceso abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Argentina Brasil América Latina American Political Science Association APSA 2012 Annual Meeting : 29 de agosto al 2 de september. Nueva Orleans : American Political Science Association, 2012
institution Universidad Católica Argentina
institution_str I-33
repository_str R-139
collection Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)
language Inglés
topic ECONOMIA POLITICA
REDISTRIBUCION
FEDERALISMO
DEMOCRACIA
PAISES EN DESARROLLO
ESTADO
INFRAESTRUCTURA
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
POLITICA COMPARADA
spellingShingle ECONOMIA POLITICA
REDISTRIBUCION
FEDERALISMO
DEMOCRACIA
PAISES EN DESARROLLO
ESTADO
INFRAESTRUCTURA
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
POLITICA COMPARADA
González, Lucas Isaac
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
Bovino, Ana
The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
topic_facet ECONOMIA POLITICA
REDISTRIBUCION
FEDERALISMO
DEMOCRACIA
PAISES EN DESARROLLO
ESTADO
INFRAESTRUCTURA
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
POLITICA COMPARADA
description Resumen: What is the role of presidents in the politics of redistribution in developing democracies? Do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence redistribution? Is redistribution shaped by political (that is, partisan) factors or do programmatic criteria play also a part? Redistribution in very unequal developing countries is a divisive issue. Most researchers recognize a crucial role of the state in redistributive politics. Despite this, there is little we know about the factors that shape government redistribution. This paper studies political and economic factors that affect the allocation of interregional redistributive transfers in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal countries in Latin America (the world’s most unequal region). The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central government may have large discretion: public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil (for the period 1999-2011), this paper shows that redistributive politics (in particular, the distribution of infrastructure funds) in developing federations is fundamentally determined by executive politics. The main claim is that presidents use redistributive transfers as a tool to build up sizeable and secure political support. We also found large variation in the relevance of Congress and programmatic criteria across cases, and that legislative overrepresentation is not always a relevant factor to explain redistribution, contrary to findings in the literature on the US and the European Union. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and the implications of these results for the broader comparative debate.
format Artículo
author González, Lucas Isaac
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
Bovino, Ana
author_facet González, Lucas Isaac
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
Bovino, Ana
author_sort González, Lucas Isaac
title The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
title_short The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
title_full The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
title_fullStr The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
title_full_unstemmed The political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
title_sort political economy of redistribution in developing federal democracies : empirical results and comparative implications
publisher American Political Science Association
publishDate 2023
url https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17096
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